Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetation and a Landowner\u27s Duty to Those off the Premises by Jones, James T. R.
Volume 39 Issue 5 Article 3 
1994 
Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural 
Vegetation and a Landowner's Duty to Those off the Premises 
James T. R. Jones 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James T. Jones, Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetation and a Landowner's 
Duty to Those off the Premises, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1263 (1994). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss5/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1994]
TRAINS, TRUCKS, TREES AND SHRUBS: VISION-BLOCKING
NATURAL VEGETATION AND A LANDOWNER'S
DUTY TO THOSE OFF THE PREMISES
JAMES T.R. JONES*
C OURTS increasingly worry over what, if anything, landowners
or other responsible people' must do to protect persons off
their premises from injuries caused by natural conditions2 existing
on their property. All courts and commentators concur that these
individuals must protect their neighbors from artificial conditions,
including non-native vegetation.3 Many tribunals, however, hold
* BA., University of Virginia; J.D., Duke University School of Law; Associate
Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 363(1) (1965) (listing possessors,
vendors, lessors or other transferors as those possibly responsible for overgrown
vegetation on their land). The Restatement defines the first of these as follows:
A possessor of land is
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control
it or
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to con-
trol it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to con-
trol it, or
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if
no other person is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b).
Id. § 328 E. In this article, phrases such as "landowner," "occupier," and "posses-
sor" all refer to those who own or possess land in accordance with the meaning of
sections 363(1) and 328 E.
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 363 cmt. b (1965). The Restate-
ment provides:
"Natural condition of the land" ... [means] that the condition of land
has not been changed by any act of a human being, whether the posses-
sor or any of his predecessors in possession, or a third person dealing
with the land either with or without the consent of the then possessor. It
is also used to include the natural growth of trees, weeds, and other vege-
tation upon land not artificially made receptive to them. On the other
hand, a structure erected upon land is a non-natural or artificial condi-
tion, as are trees or plants planted or preserved, and changes in the sur-
face by excavation or filling, irrespective of whether they are harmful in
themselves or become so only because of the subsequent operation of
natural forces.
Id.; see, e.g., Hasapopoulos v. Murphy, 689 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(defining natural condition as one not resulting from human activity); Deberjeois
v. Schneider, 604 A.2d 210, 213-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (adopting Re-
statement definitions of natural condition); Kolba v. Kusznier, 599 A.2d 194, 199
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (same). But see McGarr v. United States, 736 F.2d
912, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1984) (rejecting Restatement's distinction between natural
and artificial conditions). Unless indicated to the contrary, this article adopts the
Restatement's definition of natural conditions.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 364-71 (1965) (describing
(1263)
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that possessors of land have no obligation to take reasonable pre-
cautions to protect innocent passersby from natural circumstances. 4
Other courts strongly disagree and hold possessors of land liable in
negligence when they do not act reasonably. 5 The drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts took an intermediate position: landown-
ers need to do nothing. However, the drafters created an excep-
tion where trees on a landowner's urban property endanger
persons on adjacent public highways. 6 Of course, this provision
how possessors will be liable to persons outside land for dangerous artificial condi-
tions); 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.19 (2d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1991) (describing liability of occupier of land for injury to persons off-prem-ises); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57 (5th
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (discussing duty owed by possessor of land to those outside
premises); Richard F. May, Adjoining and Abutting Landowners: Liability for Injuries to
Persons or Property, 1 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 413, 417-19 (1960) (noting that owner
with artificial condition on land must exercise care commensurate with forseeable
danger involved); Dix W. Noel, Nuisances from Land in its Natural Condition, 56
HARv. L. REv. 772, 772 (1943) (stating that possessors of land with artificial altera-
tions, such as buildings or other structures, are under duty of care to prevent those
structures from becoming dangerous to persons outside premises).
4. E.g., Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So. 2d 231, 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (refusing to impose liability for injuries resulting from natural condi-
tions), review denied, 399 So. 2d 1142 (1981); Pyne v. Witmer, 512 N.E.2d 993, 997
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding no duty on landowner to remove foliage from prop-
erty so that motorists approaching intersection could see other motorists), aff'd on
other grounds, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (1989); Fritz v. Parkison, 397 N.W.2d 714, 717
(Iowa 1986) (holding that owner of land abutting curved highway owed motorists
no duty to remove trees on owner's property where trees did not actually obscure
traveled way); Krotz v. CSX Corp., 496 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190-91 (App. Div. 1985) (find-
ing no common law duty on landowner to control vegetation on property for bene-
fit of users of public highway).
5. See, e.g., Swanberg v. O'Mectin, 203 Cal. Rptr. 701, 704 (Ct. App. 1984)
(holding landowner liable for failure to use ordinary care in managing property);
Harvey v. Hansen, 445 A.2d 1228, 1234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (imposing duty on
property owners to remove or cut back foliage that obstructs vision of motorists);
Hamric v. Kansas City S. Ry., 718 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
owner or occupier of property abutting highway liable for injuries caused by fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 363 (1965). The Restatement
provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), neither a possessor of land, nor a
vendor, lessor, or other transferor, is liable for physical harm caused to
others outside of the land by a natural condition of the land.
(2) A possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability to persons
using a public highway for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm arising
from the condition of trees on the land near the highway.
Id. A comment explains the rationale behind the urban tree exception as follows:
The rule stated in Subsection (2) [of Section 363, supra] is an exception
which has developed as to trees near a public highway. It requires no
more than reasonable care on the part of the possessor of the land to
prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to those in the highway, arising
from the condition of the trees. In an urban area, where traffic is rela-
tively frequent, land is less heavily wooded, and acreage is small, reason-
1264
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does not address a landowner's responsibility in cases involving ru-
ral land,7 or even urban property when a hazardous natural condi-
tion other than a tree causes harm.
Overgrown vegetation often contributes to motor vehicle and
other accidents. For example, in one recent case, a shaggy hedge
obscured the sight of motorists approaching an intersection, lead-
ing to a fatal collision.8 In another case, a train struck and killed a
driver at a railroad crossing when uncut bushes on the property
abutting the intersection blocked the driver's view of the onrushing
locomotive. 9 In a third case, untrimmed trees, shrubs and brush
contributed to a car-truck collision on an adjacent highway by
blocking the drivers' vision as they approached a curve. 10 Typically,
the victims of such tragedies seek to hold the owners or occupiers
of the land on which the vision-obscuring plants are located liable
in negligence for the injuries or deaths that these conditions
caused.11 Such claimants can succeed if, but only if, the landowners
have a "duty" to control their greenery.12
This Article will discuss "the intriguing and somewhat intricate
problem of the liability of a landowner for failing to cut naturally
growing vegetation."1 3 First, it will focus on the traditional holding,
able care for the protection of travelers on the highway may require the
possessor to inspect all trees which may be in such dangerous condition
as to endanger travelers. It will at least require him to take reasonable
steps to prevent harm when he is in fact aware of the dangerous condi-
tion of the tree.
Id. § 363 cmt. e. In the course of adopting the Section 363 approach distinguish-
ing urban from rural property, one court noted that "[w]hether the land is in an
area of sufficient population density to invoke the [Section 363 urban duty] rule
requires a factual consideration of such factors as land use and traffic patterns."
Valinet v. Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. 1991).
7. A caveat to Section 363 does provide that: "The [American Law] Institute
[adopter and promulgator of the Restatement] expresses no opinion as to whether
the rule stated in Subsection (2) [of Section 363] may not apply to the possessor of
land in a rural area." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 363 caveat (1965).
8. See Pyne, 512 N.E.2d at 995 (noting that hedge obscured approaching
driver's view of other vehicles until within two car lengths of intersection).
9. See Krotz v. CSX Corp., 496 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190 (App. Div. 1985) (finding
that uncut bushes on property abutting intersection of highway and railroad right-
of-way obstructed driver's view of oncoming train).
10. See Fritz v. Parkinson, 397 N.W.2d 714, 714 (Iowa 1986) (noting presence
of overgrown vegetation on landowner's property on inside of curve in road).
11. For cases where the victims sought to hold the owners of land liable in
negligence, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the "duty" of a landowner, see. infra notes 17-24 and
accompanying text.
13. Mispagel v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 785 S.W.2d 279, 282
(Mo. 1990) (en banc). This Article focuses on the liability of private property own-
ers and public entities who are sued in their capacity as landowners. It does not
concern governmental liability for its failure to maintain safe and visually unob-
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which some courts and commentators still favor, that there is "no
duty" in natural condition cases.14 Next, it will describe the diverse
ways various tribunals have found to impose a duty.15 Finally, this
Article will explain the proper resolution of the duty dilemma, and
conclude that courts should hold that all possessors and occupiers
of property are obligated to act reasonably to safeguard those adja-
cent to their premises from harm caused by overgrown natural veg-
etation on their land. 16
I. JUDICLAL APPROACHES TO CASES WHERE NATURAL VEGETATION
ON LAND HARMS THOSE OFF THE PREMISES
Courts approach cases that feature victims who were injured by
natural conditions on adjacent land in a variety of ways. Their ulti-
mate inquiry is one of "duty"-did the landowner owe a duty to the
injured party. This query is crucial because duty is an essential pre-
requisite to negligence. 17 Thus, one who does not owe another a
structed roads. For more on this latter topic, see Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank of
Detroit v. Erie County Rd. Comm'n, 587 N.E.2d 819, 822-23 (Ohio 1992) (holding
that political subdivisions, such as townships, may be liable for breach of duty to
keep public roadways free from nuisance); Annotation, Governmental Liability for
Failure to Reduce Vegetation Obscuring View at Railroad Crossing or at Street or Highway
Intersection, 22 A.L.R. 4th 624 (1983 & Supp. 1994) (analyzing state and federal
cases that discuss governmental entities' potential liability for failure to reduce veg-
etation obscuring view at railroad crossings or other intersections).
14. For a discussion of the traditional holding imposing no duty in natural
condition cases, see infra notes 25-74 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the various rationales supporting the existence of a
duty, see infra notes 75-137 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the appropriate resolution of the "duty dilemma," see
infra notes 138-68 and accompanying text. This Article will not explore the public
and/or private nuisance law-based claims which perhaps can be pursued by indi-
viduals who are injured by natural conditions on landowners' property while those
victims are off the premises. For more on nuisance law-based claims, see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 821B, 821C, 821D, 821E, 840 (1979). As the Restate-
ment itself points out, however, courts treat negligent nuisance claims essentially
the same as claims involving ordinary negligence. See id. at ch. 13, topic 4, scope
note, at 257 (noting that there is little difference between action brought under
theory of negligence and one brought under theory of negligent public nuisance
where possessor's conduct on land is merely negligent). Accordingly, this Article
will cite relevant nuisance precedents on such issues as landowner liability for
harm natural conditions on their property cause to persons off-premises. Counsel
for injured travelers always should consider whether asserting a nuisance claim (or
claims) in addition to an ordinary negligence claim might prove beneficial.
17. The elements of negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3) causa-
tion (both in fact and proximate); and (4) actual injury. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 3, § 30 (defining prima facie elements of negligence); TERRENCE F. KELY,
MODERN TORT LIABILm. RECOvERY IN THE '90s § 6.2 (1990) (same); see, e.g., Leake
v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (defining negligence); A.L. v.
Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Mass. 1988) (listing elements which
plaintiff must prove for negligence); Millman v. County of Butler, 458 N.W.2d 207,
1266
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duty to act reasonably is not liable to the other even when he or she
carelessly harms that person. 18 Conversely, one must act reasonably
towards those to whom one owes a duty.
Courts over the years have wrestled with such specialized ques-
tions of duty as: (1) when does one have a responsibility not to
unintentionally inflict emotional distress on another; 19 (2) when
must one rescue another;20 (3) when is one obliged not to cause
215 (Neb. 1990) (listing elements of negligence); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 281 (1965) (listing elements necessary to prove negligence claim).
18. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 53 (discussing concept of duty); KiELY,
supra note 17, §§ 6.1-.3 (noting that determining existence of duty involves sum of
several factors, including foreseeability of harm, degree of certainty and closeness
of connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury).
19. See Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972) (hold-
ing that person who has witnessed negligent injury of another may recover dam-
ages for emotional distress from negligent party only if their physical safety was
threatened or they were placed in "zone of danger"); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672,
686 (Pa. 1979) (holding that recovery of damages for negligently caused mental
trauma suffered by bystander of accident is not precluded merely because by-
stander was outside "zone of danger"); 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 3, § 18.4 (dis-
cussing how generally there is no recovery for negligent emotional distress without
some kind of bodily injury or sickness); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 54, at 359-60
(stating that courts are reluctant to allow recovery for negligent emotional distress
and recognizing controversy that surrounds issue of recovery for emotional dis-
tress); KiELY, supra note 17, §§ 3.1-.14 (discussing theory of negligent infliction of
emotional distress); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS LJ. 583, 586-87 (1982)
(discussing California tort law governing recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress).
20. See Stangle v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 244 Cal. Rptr. 103, 104 (Ct. App.
1988) (finding that, absent special relationship, person is under no duty to take
affirmative action to assist or protect another); Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P.
281, 282-83 (Kan. 1903) (holding that railway employees had no legal duty to care
for wounded party after accident in which railway company was not at fault); Buch
v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H. 1898) (finding owner of land not liable
for failure to warn trespasser of danger); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 314, 315 (1965) (recognizing that, except for certain special relationships, one
does not have duty to act merely because action is necessary for another's aid or
protection); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 56, at 375 (noting that "the law has
persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common hu-
manity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other
is in danger of losing his life"); John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of
Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties
to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 867, 872-927 (stating that there is generally
no legal obligation to rescue another from impending peril and discussing propos-
als for change); Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 217-344 (1908) (discussing moral aspects of duty to
rescue); James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses'State Law Damage Actions Against the Unre-
sponsive Police, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 32-40, 74-77 (1991) (discussing general common
law rule of no duty to help others and noting its failure); Saul Levmore, Waiting for
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obli-
gations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879, 882-94, 929-41 (1986) (discussing evolution of treat-
ment of rescue in American law) ;Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and
Proposa4 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 423, 424-45 (1985) (examining lack of duty to
1267
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injury to an unborn child;2 1 and most importantly for this Article,
(4) when does the owner or occupier of land have a duty
to safeguard the premises when another is on, or near, them.22
Where tribunals draw the line on duty, as well as when they
adjudicate proximate cause,2 3 can determine important policy con-
rescue and proposing statute that would impose duty to aid); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 257 (1980) (arguing for change of
common law rule on duty to rescue).
21. See Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 290 (Del. 1989)
(holding that parents of child with genetic disorder had actionable common law
claim against health care providers for negligence in performing prenatal chromo-
some study); Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J. 1984) (dis-
tinguishing between actions for "wrongful life" and "wrongful birth"); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906 (N.Y. 1969) (finding cause of action for emotional
distress where negligence of third party resulted in stillbirth of child); see also 3
HARPER ET AL., supra note 3, § 18.3 (discussing strict general rule that disallows
actions on behalf of children born with defects due to prenatal injuries); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 3, § 55 (discussing duty in context of prenatal injuries); KIELY,
supra note 17, §§ 6.4-.6 (discussing modern duty issues that have arisen with re-
spect to rights of unborn); Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in 'Wrongful Life"
Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 512 (1991) (proposing three remedial approaches
for recognizing children's claims for negligent genetic counseling); Horace B.
Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injuiy to the Unborn:
Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1401, 1404-
13 (examining current state of law governing injuries to unborn and analyzing
underlying legal policies); cf. A Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to
Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 637-64 (1986) (analyzing
cases that deal with interference with right to die).
22. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (imposing duty on
landowners to use reasonable care in management of their land); Barmore v. El-
more, 403 N.E.2d 1355, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding duty owed by owner of
premises to invitee is greater than that owed to licensee); Hayes v. Malkan, 258
N.E.2d 695, 696 (N.Y. 1970) (finding landowner not liable for injury to traveler
arising out of collision with pole on private property); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co.
of Am., 284 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Wis. 1979) (holding that landlord must exercise rea-
sonable care towards tenants and others on premises with permission); see also 5
HARPER ET AL., supra note 3, at §§ 27.1-.21 (discussing duties of owners and occupi-
ers of land); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 57-64 (same); JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE
LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY ch. 1-3 (2d ed. 1988) (examining liability of possessor of
land to trespassers, licensees and invitees); Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-
The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REv. 99, 102-55 (1982) (discussing tradi-
tional tort liability of landlords and expansive change in duty owed by landlords
that has occurred); Glenn A. McCleary, The Possessor's Responsibilities as to Trees, 29
Mo. L. REv. 159, 159-60 (1964) (noting that landowners traditionally are not liable
for harm caused by natural conditions on their land but that traditional rule has
changed somewhat with regard to trees).
23. Proximate causation is a public policy-oriented doctrine. Under it, courts
can absolve defendants even though their breaches of duty harmed others. Thus,
it clearly is analogous with duty. SeePetition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821,
824-25 (2d Cir. 1968) (exonerating vessel owner from liability because vessel's
breaking loose, traveling downstream and crashing into bridge causing damage
was held too tenuous and remote to permit recovery); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d
1219, 1224-25 (N.J. 1984) (holding that social host, who provided alcohol to guest
knowing guest would soon drive, was liable for injuries inflicted on third party due
to negligent operation of motor vehicle by guest); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
1268
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cerns. 24 As the following discussion demonstrates, courts making
these decisions also resolve disputes about the off-premises liability
of landowners.
A. Traditional Rule That Landowners Have No Duty to Protect Those
Off Their Premises From Harm Caused by Natural Vegetation
on Their Land
Traditionally, courts have ruled that landowners need not pay
for the harm natural conditions of their land inflict on those off it
because the landowners owe such persons no duty.2 5 As the au-
thors of the leading treatise explain:
The origin of this [rule] ... lay in an early day when much
land, in fact most, was unsettled or uncultivated, and the
burden of inspecting it and putting it in safe condition
would have been not only unduly onerous, but out of all
proportion to any harm likely to result.26
N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that plaintiff could not recover where rail-
road guard pushed passenger aboard train and package containing fireworks fell
and exploded, causing scale on platform many feet away to fall on and injure plain-
tiff); see also 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 3, § 18.1, at 650 (noting that law uses
proximate cause and duty to limit liability for negligence, but they "are often used
in a confused and overlapping way"); 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 20.1, 20.4-.6
(discussing legal and proximate cause); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 42-44 (dis-
cussing proximate cause, unforseeable consequences and intervening causes); Pat-
rick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 54-82 (1991) (analyzing history and modern theo-
ries of proximate cause); Jane Stapleton, Law, Causation and Common Sense, 8 Ox-
FORD J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 112-14 (1988) (discussing common sense approach to
causation); E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Ra-
tional Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1, 11-22 (ex-
plaining and evaluating approaches to analysis of proximate cause).
24. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 53 (discussing policy concerns involved
in proximate cause analysis); KIELY, supra note 17, §§ 6.1-.3 (discussing need to
examine currentjudicial analysis of duty question); FlemingJames,Jr., Scope of Duty
in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 778, 780-800 (1953) (discussing interests pro-
tected, and risks protected against, by scope of duty in negligence cases).
25. See FRANcIs H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 47 & n.30 (1926)
(stating that duty of care does not arise out of ownership alone); 5 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 27.19, at 308-09 (stating that occupier's duty to prevent injury to
persons outside premises from natural conditions on land is limited and may not
exist at all); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 57 at 390 (recognizing traditional rule
that landowner has "no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of purely natural
origin upon his land); May, supra note 3, at 417 (noting longstanding principle
that landowner is under no duty to take affirmative action to remedy natural con-
ditions on land); McCleary, supra note 22, at 159-60 (noting that landowner tradi-
tionally is not legally responsible for harm caused by natural conditions on land);
Noel, supra note 3, at 772-73 (recognizing authority that states that landowner is
under no duty to remedy natural conditions that threaten or cause harm).
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 57, at 390; accord Noel, supra note 3, at 773;
see, e.g., Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So. 2d 231, 233-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
7
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App. 1980) (Schwartz, J., dissenting) (discussing basis of traditional rule regarding
natural conditions on land but finding rule inapplicable in modern society), review
denied, 399 So. 2d 1142 (1981); Mahurin v. Lockhart, 390 N.E.2d 523, 524 (fI1. App.
Ct. 1979) (discussing development of traditional rule but finding it inapplicable in
urban and developed areas); Valinet v. Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. 1991)
(discussing origin of traditional rule shielding landowners from liability for harm
caused by natural conditions on property to those off property); Hensley v. Mont-
gomery County, 334 A.2d 542, 545 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (same).
The rule regarding natural conditions is an offshoot of the traditional nonfea-
sance/misfeasance distinction in duty to act negligence cases. Under this dichot-
omy, there is a real difference "between active misconduct working positive injury
to others and passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect them from
harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); see KEETON ET AL., supra
note 3, § 56, at 373 (noting distinction law recognizes between misfeasance and
nonfeasance). Courts through the years have proved far less likely to hold the
inactive party negligent than the one whose active carelessness harmed another.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 56, at 373; seeJones, supra note 20, at 12 n.32 (not-
ing that liability will more readily be imposed upon party who acts affirmatively
than upon one who simply fails to protect another from risk created by some
outside source). Professor Bohlen long ago observed about a landowner's liability
to his or her neighbors:
No duty [to protect others] arose out of mere passive ownership. Today
it is still true that no duty to take affirmative steps to protect others can
arise save from a use of property by the owner for his own purposes. If
for his purpose he erected a structure, he would be bound to maintain it
in repair so that it should not injure those adjacent. Nor could, any more
than now, [he or she] act upon his land or use his land in such a way as to
cause injury to his neighbors. He was not bound to act at all; but if he
did, he must act carefully.
BOHLEN, supra note 25, at 47.
Thus, one who unreasonably left his or her property in its natural condition,
altering nothing, was not liable for his or her nonfeasance to a neighbor injured by
the natural condition, although that landowner could have been liable if his or her
active misfeasance (such as unreasonably bringing animals or plants onto land,
building a structure, etc.) harmed the neighbor. See id. at 47 (noting marked dif-
ference in liability at common law for consequences of misfeasance and nonfea-
sance); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 57, at 390-91 (stating that landowners
generally are liable only if they have altered conditions on their land); Noel, supra
note 3, at 796 (recognizing argument that liability should not be imposed where
landowner has not acted to create danger, but noting several instances where lia-
bility has been imposed on landowner despite fact landowner did not create dan-
ger). As the explanatory notes to the original Restatement of Torts pointed out:
A possessor is under no duty to make his land safe except in respect to
such conditions as have resulted from an earlier human activity. This may
be due to a surviva4 often found where the rights and liabilities of the owners and
possessors of land are concerned, of an early general theory that activity is essential
to liability, or it may be due to the concept that those who take possession
of land or establish highways must bear those natural disadvantages which
the location of the land or highway involves.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 234 Explanatory Note, at 30 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1929) (emphasis added).
In Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., the California Supreme Court pointed to the
traditional nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction as an additional rationale for the
rule that landowners are not liable for harm natural conditions on the land cause
to those off the premises. Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121, 1125-26 (Cal.
1981) (en banc). For a more detailed on the nonfeasance/misfeasance distinc-
tion, see infra notes 80-85, 142-50 and accompanying text.
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Thus, British and related courts long declined to award damages in
negligence/nuisance cases involving harm caused by natural condi-
tions to those off the land.2 7 The English Court of Common Pleas
may have been the first tribunal to deny recovery for an off-prem-
ises injury caused by a "natural" condition when it issued the late
sixteenth century decision in Boulston's Case.28 The court held that
a landowner was not responsible for damage wild rabbits living on
his land caused to the property of his neighbor.2 9
A number of subsequent courts cited Boulston's Case as prece-
dent that one has no duty to control natural conditions on his or
her propertys ° Many courts found for landowners and against
those situated nearby when, for example, large numbers of
pheasants invaded the neighbors' property and consumed their
crops;31 hordes of fecund rats ate the neighbor's grain;32 or, as in
Boulston's Case itself, overly prolific rabbits damaged the neighbor's
For a thoughtful overview of the benefits of the nonfeasance/misfeasance dis-
tinction, see David W. Burcham, Note, Sprecher v. Adamson Companies: Nonfea-
sance Immunity Slides by the California Supreme Court, 16 Lov. LA. L. REv. 625, 641-46
(1983). See generally Adler, supra note 20, at 878-86 (analyzing problems underly-
ing distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance).
27. For a discussion of the courts' practice of treating negligence and nui-
sance claims in essentially the same manner, see supra note 16.
28. 77 Eng. Rep. 216 (C.P. 1597).
29. Id. The actual basis for the decision in Boulston's Case is somewhat ob-
scure. The defendant there had built "coney-boroughs," or rabbit burrows, on his
land to attract the rabbits that later harmed his neighbor's property. Id. at 216-17.
Thus, the rabbits arguably were not "naturally" on his property because he had
encouraged their presence. See A.L. Goodhart, Liability for Things Naturally on the
Land, 4 CAMBRmDGE L.J. 13, 20 (1930) (analyzing grounds for decision of non-liabil-
ity and argument that rabbits were not naturally on land); Noel, supra note 3, at
782 & n.48 (noting that non-liability applies even though animals have been at-
tracted to land by owner's activities so long as animals are ferae naturae). The court
in Boulston's Case apparently ruled as it did because the defendant had no property
rights in the rabbits and thus was not responsible for the harm they caused his
neighbor. 77 Eng. Rep. at 217; see also Goodhart, supra, at 20. In his article, Profes-
sor Goodhart effectively challenged those who favored the "no liability for natural
conditions" approach by critically reviewing the early precedents and demonstrat-
ing why many, like Boulston's Case, did not really support their arguments. Good-
hart, supra, at 15-33.
Of course, Boulston's Case was not a true negligence decision because it pre-
dated the rise of negligence law by at least two centuries. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 3, § 28 (stating that negligence law only coalesced in early nineteenth cen-
tury). Still, courts later deemed it a starting point when they faced the off-premises
injury issue. For examples of courts that began their analysis of the duty owed to a
neighbor with Boulston's Case, see infra note 30 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Seligman v. Docker, [1949] 1 Ch. 53, 60-61 (1948) (beginning
analysis of duty owed to persons off-premises with Boulston's Case); Steam v. Pren-
tice Bros., Ltd., [1919] 1 K.B. 394, 396-97 (1918) (same); Brady v. Warren, [1900]
2 Ir. R. 632, 638, 644-45, 659 (Q.B.) (same).
31. Seligman, [1949) 1 Ch. at 53-54.
32. Steam, [1919] 1 K.B. at 396.
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fields.33 Tribunals also extended the no liability principle to vegeta-
ble or inanimate natural conditions, exculpating defendants whose
land contained large rocks which overhung and threatened their
neighbors,3 4 an excess of thistles whose seeds blew to germination
and abundant destructive growth next door,3 5 or many noxious
prickly pears which broke down a protective fence and permitted
wild native dogs to ravage an adjoining herd of sheep.3 6 Lord Chief
Justice Coleridge accurately summed up the view of British courts
when he stated that: "[t]here can be no duty as between adjoining
occupiers to [control] . . . the natural growth of the soil."3 7 All
agreed that any "attempt to impose on an owner, who is using and
enjoying his land in the ordinary manner of its use and reasonably,
liability for damage sustained by the property of another through
natural agencies [must fail]."a8
American courts early on adopted the British "no duty" ap-
proach to suits for damage natural conditions caused to adjoining
property. They denied recovery, for example, in cases involving un-
trimmed vegetation that contributed to collisions39 and injurious
weeds which invaded a neighbor's acreage. 40 American courts fur-
ther held a landowner has no duty to manage sand naturally on his
33. Hilton v. Green, 175 Eng. Rep. 1302, 1304-05 (1862); Brady, [1900] 2 Ir.
R. at 632.
34. Pontardawe Rural Dist. Council v. Moore-Gwyn, [1929] 1 Ch. 656 (1928).
35. Giles v. Walker, 24 Q.B. 656 (Eng. CA. 1890). Some authorities correctly
have noted that the thistles in Gi/es were not really natural conditions because they
only grew after the landowner cultivated his property. Id. Thus, they most likely
resulted from a natural use of the soil. Viewed in that light, Giles was even more
expansive than a mere natural condition case would have been. Its holding appar-
ently exculpates a landowner when either a natural condition or a natural use of
the land harms a neighbor. See, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 29, at 15-16 (noting that
thistles involved in Giles were not natural growth of soil in its natural condition);
Noel, supra note 3, at 778-79 (stating rule that no liability exists in situations where
alterations made to land are result of normal acts of husbandry).
36. Sparke v. Osborne, 7 C.L.R. 51 (1908) (Austl.).
37. Giles, 24 Q.B. at 657 (emphasis added).
38. Pontardawe, [1929] 1 Ch. at 658. Accord, e.g., Sparke, 7 C.L.R. at 59-60, 63,
70-71, 71-74, 75.
39. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Alton R.R., 278 Ill. App. 551, 557 (App. Ct. 1935)
(denying recovery from landowner for injuries suffered in collision); Bohm v. Ra-
cette, 236 P. 811, 812-13 (Kan. 1925) (holding that owner of land adjoining high-
way is not liable to those injured in collision caused by hedges obstructing view).
40. See, e.g., Langer v. Goode, 131 N.W. 258, 258-59 (N.D. 1911) (finding
landowner not liable for damage to neighbor's property caused by wild mustard
growing on landowner's property); Gulf, C. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Oakes, 58 S.W.
999, 1002 (Tex. 1900) (finding landowner not liable for damage to neighbor's
property caused by Bermuda grass growing on landowner's property); Vance v.
Southern Kan. Ry., 152 S.W. 743, 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (finding landowner
not liable for damage to neighbor's property caused by Russian thistle growing on
landowner's property).
1272 [Vol. 39: p. 1263
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or her premises41 or to remove dead leaves and similar combustible
natural materials which are lying on a forest floor.42 Additionally,
the courts ruled that a landowner is not responsible when the
stench from a naturally occurring, putrid and stagnant pond
bothers those in the vicinity43 or the natural flow or drainage of
water from a landowner's property harms a neighbor.44 All con-
curred that "a man does not become a wrongdoer by leaving his
property in a state of nature."45 Otherwise, courts feared economic
ruin would befall landowners-if a duty were laid upon them, land-
owners would "become liable ... to respond in damages that may
sweep away the value of [their] whole [farms] ... ajury influenced
by sympathy for the injured party are [sic] so prone to find the
accident the result of negligence upon the slightest pretext."46
While many American jurisdictions no longer adopt this posi-
tion, or at least not when the issue is overgrown vegetation that ob-
structs the view of drivers on public highways,47 a number of
jurisdictions still follow the traditional rule 48 or at least the rule as it
41. See, e.g., Ettl v. Land & Loan Co., 5 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. 1939) (stating
general rule that owner of land in its natural condition is not liable for injury
caused by extraordinary or ordinary forces of nature, so long as owner has not
interfered with natural condition).
42. See, e.g., Salmon v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 38 NJ.L. 5, 10-13 (NJ. 1875)
(holding that person owning land contiguous to railway is not required to keep
leaves, that fall from trees on property, from being carried by wind onto railway).
43. See, e.g., Roberts v. Harrison, 28 S.E. 995, 996 (Ga. 1897) (holding that
owner is not liable when water accumulates on land from natural causes and not by
any act of owner); Barring v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. (1 Duv.) 95, 96-98 (1865)
(holding owner of putrid pond that produced injurious odors not liable).
44. See, e.g., Livezey v. Schmidt, 29 S.W. 25, 25-26 (Ky. 1895) (holding that no
right of action accrues for injury arising from natural flow or drainage of water);
Mohr v. Gault, 10 Wis. 455, 455 (1860) (holding that obstruction of stream caused
by washing down of its banks does not constitute nuisance unless such obstruction
is attributable to acts or agency of man).
45. Salmon, 38 NJ.L. at 11.
46. Zacharias v. Nesbitt, 185 N.W. 295, 296 (Minn. 1921). Accord, e.g., Cham-
bers v. Whelen, 44 F.2d 340, 341 (4th Cir. 1930) (applying West Virginia law).
47. For an analysis of decisions that adopt the view that landowners can be
liable for injuries caused by natural conditions on their property to those off-prem-
ises, see infra notes 75-137 and accompanying text.
48. For cases applying the traditional rule, see supra notes 39-44 and accom-
panying text. Of course, if a natural condition physically encroaches into adjoin-
ing space owned by the public, such as a right-of-way by a public road, it protrudes
beyond the property of its owner. As a result, he or she may be held liable for an
intrusion, such as obscuring a traffic sign or signal, regardless of the traditional
rule of no liability for a natural condition that is located solely on his or her land.
See, e.g., Armas v. Metropolitan Dade County, 429 So. 2d 59, 60-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that city had duty to remove foliage obstructing motorists'
view of stop sign); Morales v. Costa, 427 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that users of public right-of-way have right to expect it will not be unrea-
sonably obstructed); Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Erie County Rd.
11
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is set forth in the non-proviso portion of the Restatement.49 For ex-
ample, Illinois courts often have ruled that landowners have no
duty to insure that plants on their property do not block motorists'
vision.50 Esworthy v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.51 is representative
of the Illinois approach.
In Esworthy, several defendants with property adjacent to the
intersection of a road and a railway line had trees on their premises
which blocked the view of any motorists who approached the cross-
ing.5 2 The special administrator of the estate of an individual who
was killed when his car collided with a train at the crossing alleged
he died because the trees obstructed his view of the oncoming loco-
motive.55 The Appellate Court of Illinois denied recovery against
the property owners because they had no obligation to the de-
ceased driver.54 As the Illinois Supreme Court observed a few years
later in another case, "landowners do not owe a duty to maintain
their property in such a way that it does not obstruct the view of
travelers on an adjacent highway."55
Other courts have ruled similarly. Florida tribunals repeatedly
have employed the "no duty" approach. In Stevens v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.,56 the court summed up Florida's position: "[T]here
Comm'n, 587 N.E.2d 819, 824-25 (Ohio 1992) (holding landowner liable where
crops grew in highway right-of-way and obstructed driver's vision). But see Sullivan
v. Silver Palm Properties, Inc., 558 So. 2d 409, 410-11 (Fla. 1990) (holding that
landowner did not have duty to prevent subterranean root growth of trees located
adjacent to public right-of-way).
49. For a discussion of the rule as it is set forth in the Restatement, see supra
notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365, 1367-69 (Ill. 1991) (holding
landowner did not have duty to warn passing bicyclist of driveway hidden by plants
on his property); Esworthy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 520 N.E.2d 1044, 1046 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (holding that owners of property adjoining railroad crossing did not owe
duty to motorists to keep property free from foliage where view of tracks and cross-
ing signals were visible to motorists); Pyne v. Witmer, 512 N.E.2d 993, 997 (IIl.
App. Ct. 1987) (holding that landowners had no duty to remove foliage from their
property so motorists approaching intersection could see other approaching mo-
torists), aff'd on other grounds, 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989); Nichols ex rel. Nichols v.
Sitko, 510 N.E.2d 971, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that failure of property
owner to trim weeds on property to reasonable height did not render owner liable
for injuries sustained by minibike rider struck by car whose driver's vision was im-
paired by foliage); cf. Manning v. Hazekamp, 569 N.E.2d 1168, 1172-74 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (finding no duty to place stop sign where motorists' vision not impaired
by parked cars); Cross v. Moehring, 544 N.E.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(finding no duty to remove advertising sign that obstructs view at intersection).
51. 520 N.E.2d at 1044.
52. Id. at 1045.
53. Id. at 1045-46.
54. Id. at 1046.
55. Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (I1. 1991).
56. 415 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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is no common law duty on a landowner to maintain his property in
a condition so that a motorist approaching a public highway inter-
section can see other approaching motorists."57 The ruling was
predicated on the view that the landowner should not have to watch
out for vegetation that might block the driver's vision, but that the
motorist should watch out for the natural obstruction.58 Arizona
courts also have employed the traditional doctrine,5 9 as have courts
in New York,60 Iowa,6 1 Louisiana, 62 Missouri6 3 and other states.r
In Fritz v. Parkison,65 the Iowa Supreme Court listed many of
the concerns that led it to find no duty in natural condition cases.
First, the court noted Iowa's policy of keeping highways free from
obstructions and hazards, but held that visually obstructive vegeta-
tion is not sufficiently dangerous to fall under this policy.66 Next,
57. Id. at 52; accord, e.g., Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that absent ordinance, landowner has no duty to maintain
property so that motorists have clear view of traffic); Evans v. Southern Holding
Corp., 391 So. 2d 231, 232-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (same), review denied, 399
So. 2d 1142 (1981).
58. See Pedigo, 395 So. 2d at 616-17 (stating that motorists should have ob-
served bush and controlled their vehicles as situation required); Evans, 391 So. 2d
at 232 ("Obstruction of view when motoring on a highway must be observed by all
motorists. Every user of the highway is required to exercise reasonable care for his
own safety and protection." (quoting Bassett v. Edwards, 30 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla.
1947))).
59. See Coburn v. City of Tucson, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080-81 (Ariz. 1984) (stating
that landowner has no duty to use land so as to protect travelers); Boyle v. City of
Phoenix, 563 P.2d 905, 906-07 (Ariz. 1977) (same); Rodgers v. Ray, 457 P.2d 281,
283-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (same); see also Beals v. State, 721 P.2d 1154, 1158-59
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (finding state not liable to riparian landowners for permit-
ting vegetation to grow and cause flooding).
60. See Barnes v. Stone-Quinn, 606 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (App. Div. 1993) (find-
ing landowner has no common law duty to control vegetation on property for
benefit of motorists); Scattareggia v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 510 N.Y.S.2d
455, 458 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (same); Krotz v. CSX Corp., 496 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (App.
Div. 1985) (same).
61. See Fritz v. Parkison, 397 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 1986) (finding landowner
owed no duty to motorist where landowner planted trees but trees did not obstruct
traveled way); cf. Shaw v. Soo Line R.R., 463 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Iowa 1990) (following
Fritz and holding landowners not liable to motorists where parked trailers did not
obstruct roadway).
62. See Sierra-Melendez v. Brown, 410 So. 2d 258, 261 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that, absent statute, landowner bordering roadway owes no duty to
motorists).
63. See Hasapopoulos v. Murphy, 689 S.W.2d 118, 121-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding landowner not liable for damage to neighbor's property from natural
growth of healthy trees).
64. See, e.g., Melnick v. CSX Corp., 540 A.2d 1133, 1138 (Md. 1988) (finding
landowner not liable for damage to neighbor's building where landowner allowed
vegetation to encroach on neighbor's land, but neighbor had self-help remedy).
65. 397 N.W.2d 714, 715-16 (Iowa 1986).
66. Id.
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the court referred to "a well-established state goal to encourage the
growth and cultivation of trees and discourage their wanton de-
struction." 67 The court feared that a strict rule that readily holds
landowners liable for their overgrown vegetation might lead them
to cut down their trees whether or not the trees violated the law.68
It believed that such actions, in turn, certainly could work against
the pro-tree policy. 69 Third, the court looked at who most easily
can prevent the accidents to which overgrown vegetation con-
tributes, and concluded that motorists more readily can do so by
taking proper precautions.70 The landowner, on the other hand,
"[o] rdinarily... would have no expertise in determining what does
or does not constitute sufficient visibility or in concluding what
steps would be required to select offending trees. '71 Finally, the
court noted the usual distinctions between natural and artificial
conditions and rural and urban property, and held that they weigh
in favor of the traditional "no duty" for natural conditions rule. 72
Viewing all these considerations in concert, the court believed they
justified the finding that the landowner had no duty.73 Other
courts also have raised the issues of unfair and excessive litigation
and/orjudicial economy as additional support tojustify their nonli-
ability decisions.74
Thus, courts in a number of jurisdictions have agreed that
landowners are not liable for the harm natural conditions on their
property cause to their neighbors or those traveling on the adjoin-
ing highway. When they consider whether to impose a duty in such
cases, the courts conclude that the cost to property owners that
would result from the imposition of a duty is excessive and would
cause landowners to take socially undesirable precautions. These
67. Id. at 716.
68. Id.; accord Hasapopoulos v. Murphy, 689 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985). The Hasapopoulos court stated: "Possible exposure [of landowners] to lia-
bility would warrant the uprooting of trees and shrubbery in proximity to bound-
ary lines resulting in non-aesthetic barrenness." Id. at 121.
69. Fritz, 397 N.W.2d at 716.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 716-17.
73. Id. at 717.
74. See Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So. 2d 231, 232-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
Ap. 1980) (finding landowner liable would give motorist in every collision case
right to litigate before jury whether landowner used property reasonably), review
denied, 399 So. 2d 1142 (1981); see also Sanem v. Home Ins. Co., 350 N.W.2d 89, 93-
94 (Wis. 1984) (expressing concern that allowing recovery would lead to future
fraudulent claims).
1276 [Vol. 39: p. 1263
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courts accordingly hold that the traditional no liability approach is
best.
B. Modern Rule That Landowners Have a Duty to Protect Those Off
Their Premises from Harm Caused by Natural Vegetation on
Their Land
Several jurisdictions have abandoned the non-proviso portion
of the Restatement and the traditional "no duty" for natural condi-
tions rule. Such rulings are illustrated by the California Supreme
Court's 1981 decision in Sprecher v. Adamson Cos.75 There, the court
wrestled with "the present validity of the old common law rule
which immunized a possessor of land from liability for injury
caused by a natural condition of his land to person or property noi:
on his land."76
In Sprecher, the defendants owned land that contained a natu-
rally occurring, periodically active landslide. The landslide had ex-
isted since at least the early 1900's and the defendants had done
nothing to affect it.77 In 1978, heavy spring rains activated the
slide, which then damaged the plaintiff's home. When he filed
suit, the trial court invoked the traditional "no duty" rule and dis-
missed his claim. 78 The California Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Rose Bird, rejected that line of authority
and reversed and remanded the case. 79
Chief Justice Bird reviewed the natural condition rule in
Sprecher and found it sorely wanting. She noted that it was based, at
least in part, on the ancient distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance and the "no duty to act" rule which traditionally ap-
plied in nonfeasance cases, unless a special relationship existed be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant. 80 She spurned this approach,
75. 636 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1981) (en banc). For more details about Sprecher, see
John Benham, Note, Tort Liability: California Abolishes the Landowner's Immunity for
Harm Caused by Natural Conditions- Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 1983 S. III.
U. LJ. 247; Richard A. Bentley, Note, Torts-Liability Without Fault- The Beginning
of the End of Immunity From Landowner's Liability for Natural Conditions on His Land-
Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 5 WHrrrMR L. REv. 105 (1983); Leonora M. Bova, Com-
ment, California Sidewalks: A Comprehensive Scheme for Determining Municipal and
Abutter Liabilities, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 463, 483-85 (1991). See generally
Burcham, supra note 26.
76. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1121.
77. Id. at 1122.
78. Id. at 1121-22.
79. Id. at 1130.
80. Id. at 1125-26. For a discussion of special relationships between plaintiffs
and defendants that create a duty to act, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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analogizing to Rowland v. Christian1 and the modern decisions that
hold landowners to a duty of ordinary care towards those who come
onto their premises, regardless of whether they could be classified
as trespassers, licensees, or invitees. 82 The Sprecher court concluded
that "the traditional characterization of a defendant's failure to take
affirmative steps to prevent a natural condition from causing harm
as nonactionable nonfeasance conflicts sharply with modem per-
ceptions of the obligations which flow from the possession of
land."8 3 The court decided there was no reason to distinguish be-
tween artificial and natural conditions, and thus no reason to im-
munize landowners from liability for harm caused by the latter but
not the former.84 Chief Justice Bird noted that if the traditional
rule survived, landowners anomalously would have no duty towards
those off their premises even though under Rowland they owed one
to all who came onto their premises. 85
Finally, the Sprecher court held that the no duty for natural con-
ditions rule "bears little relationship to the major factors which
should determine whether immunity should be given the possessor
of land for harm done by a natural condition of the land."8 6 The
court determined that the difficulty in obtaining insurance which a
property owner might experience when attempting to purchase
coverage against harm caused by natural conditions on the land did
not warrant maintaining the traditional rule.8 7 Thus, the court con-
81. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). In Rowland, the California Supreme Court held
that the proper test to determine the liability of a landowner is whether, in the
management of the property, the landowner acted as a reasonable person in view
of the probability of injury to others. Id. at 564-66. The court specifically rejected
the trespasser/licensee/invitee distinction. Id.
82. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1126. The court stated that "[m]odem cases recog-
nize that after Rowland, the duty to take affirmative action for the protection of
individuals coming upon the land is grounded in the possession of the premises
. .. I d.
83. Id. at 1127; see Adler, supra note 20, at 909-10 (noting abandonment of
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction by Sprecher court).
84. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1127-28.
85. Id. at 1128.
86. Id. The Sprecher court further elaborated:
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the
extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequence to the com-
munity of imposing a duty to exercise care have little, if any, relationship
to the natural, as opposed to artificial, origin of the condition causing
harm.
87. Id.
1278 [Vol. 39: p. 1263
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cluded that "[t]he distinction between artificial and natural condi-
tions should be rejected."88 While the landowner still only will be
liable if the claimant proves he or she acted unreasonably, at least
at the outset, the landowner has some duty to act.8 9 The court re-
manded Sprecherfor ajury to resolve whether the defendants acted
negligently.90
The Sprecher decision significantly influenced vision-blocking
vegetation cases. In one typical action after Sprecher, bushy shrub-
bery contributed to an intersection collision. 91 Citing Sprecher, the
court found the landowner had a duty, that included inspecting the
bushes at issue, irrespective of the usual natural/artificial condition
distinction. 92
Harvey v. Hansen93 featured yet another intersection collision
caused, at least in part, by overgrown vegetation. A trial judge
granted the landowner summary judgment after assuming the
plants were natural, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania re-
versed. 94 The court addressed the natural/artificial condition di-
chotomy in the following words:
The "natural condition" standard for imposing or not
imposing liability creates the anomalous situation of im-
posing liability on a landowner who improves and main-
tains his property while precluding liability of a
neighboring landowner who allows the "natural condi-
tion" of his property to run wild. Under this analysis, land-
owner A may plant hedges or bushes around the
perimeter of his property and if they are allowed to be-
come too thick or too tall so as to obstruct a motorist's
vision of an intersection, he will be held liable. Land-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1128-29. For a discussion of duty as a prerequisite to negligence, see
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
90. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1130. Justice Richardson expressed considerable
doubt that any jury could find the Sprecher defendants negligent because of the
landslide condition on their land. Id. (Richardson, J., concurring).
91. Swanberg v. O'Mectin, 203 Cal. Rptr. 701 (Ct. App. 1984).
92. Id. at 704; see also Hamric v. Kansas City S. Ry., 718 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[T] he owner or occupier of premises abutting a highway has a
duty to exercise reasonable care not to jeopardize or endanger the safety of motor-
ist[s] using the highway as a means of passage ... the owner or occupier is liable
for injuries that proximately resulted from his negligent acts in this respect.").
93. 445 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). In Harvey, the defendant owned
land located at an intersection where an accident took place. Id. at 1229. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant's trees and shrubs obstructed her lateral view
as she tried to cross the intersection. Id.
94. Id. at 1231.
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owner B, on the other hand, may neglect his property, al-
lowing it to be overrun and overgrown with weeds, plants,
grasses and other natural foliage, to an equal or greater det-
riment to passing motorists, but with no liability to him-
self. The distinction appears to be arbitrary at best.95
Accordingly, the court repudiated the prior Pennsylvania case that
had recognized the distinction.96 At least one later tribunal has ac-
knowledged Harvey's disavowal of the traditional rule.97
When viewed together, decisions like Sprecher, Harvey and their
progeny represent a significant new approach to the duty analysis
regarding natural conditions and a repudiation of the traditional
no duty for natural conditions rule. Courts which adopt this view
hold careless landowners responsible for any harm things on their
property cause to those outside it. To do otherwise, such tribunals
feel, would be a miscarriage of justice. A third group of jurisdic-
tions take one of several intermediate positions between the tradi-
tional and modern duty rules.
C. Intermediate Judicial Positions on Whether Landowners Have a
Duty to Protect Those Off Their Premises from Harm Caused
by Natural Vegetation on Their Land
Various tribunals have assumed one of several stances some-
where between the absolute extremes of "no duty" and "always a
duty" in natural condition cases. The principal alternative ap-
proach follows the Restatement's and requires landowners to use rea-
sonable care to safeguard travelers against dangerous trees along
roads in urban areas, even though possessors would owe no duty if
their property were in rural areas.99 Courts distinguish between ur-
ban and rural trees because the reasons that justify the traditional
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 1234. The court repudiated the case of Haldeman v. Mercer, 30 Pa.
D. & C.2d 435 (1963), which had adopted the natural/artificial distinction. Id.; see
also Barker v. Brown, 340 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (rejecting natural/
artificial distinction in residential, but not rural, areas).
97. SeeMcGarrv. United States, 736 F.2d 912, 914-17 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying
Pennsylvania law and discussing Harvey in detail); see also Okkerse v. Howe, 593
A.2d 431, 434-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (citing Harvey and warning landowners to
cut back foliage that obstructs drivers at intersections).
98. For a discussion and the text of the Restatement, see supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.
99. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 57, at 391 (discussing Restate-
ment rule that urban landowners owe duty to travelers while rural landowners do
not); McCleary, supra note 22, at 160-62, 171-72 (discussing landowner liability to
highway users for injuries caused by falling trees); Noel, supra note 3, at 789-91
(discussing landowners' duty to protect highway travelers from falling trees).
1280 [Vol. 39: p. 1263
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no duty rule are not present in the urban setting.100 As one tribu-
nal has stated:
The traditional rule of non-liability developed at a
time when land was mostly unsettled and uncultivated.
The landowner, unable to keep a daily account of and
remedy all of the dangerous conditions arising out of
purely natural causes, was therefore shielded from liability
out of necessity. While there are many reasons to con-
tinue the traditional rule in regions that are largely rural,
there is little or no reason to apply it in urban and other
developed areas. In urban centers, it would not be unduly
burdensome for a small property owner to inspect his
property and take reasonable precautions against danger-
ous natural conditions .... [A] landowner in a residential
or urban area has a duty to others outside of his land to
exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk
of harm arising from defective or unsound trees on the
premises .... 101
Thus, for reasons of economics and simple practicality, various ju-
risdictions decline to divorce urban landowners from responsibility
for their roadside trees, 10 2 or even sometimes for those that are not
100. For a discussion of the reasons supporting the traditional rule, see supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
101. Mahurin v. Lockhart, 390 N.E.2d 523, 524-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (cita-
tion omitted); see also Chandler v. Larson, 500 N.E.2d 584, 587-88 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (following Mahurin rationale and finding urban landowner owed adjoining
landowner duty of reasonable care); Bandy v. Bosie, 477 N.E.2d 840, 841 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (discussing Mahurin and distinction between rural and urban settings).
102. See, e.g., Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(finding that level of maintenance and inspection depends on characteristics of
roadway and land; heavily traveled urban areas may require more attention); Book-
hultz v. Maryland Midland Ry., 688 F. Supp. 1061, 1063 (D. Md. 1988) ("[T]he
cases.., impose a burden of inspection on urban tree-owners, either because they
are more reasonably to be expected to see their trees on a regular basis, or because
the heightened danger to unsuspecting urbanites (as compared to rural passersby)
requires such higher duty as a matter of public policy .... An urban dweller,
responsible for only a few trees, which he can easily and regularly inspect, has the
duty to use reasonable care, under ordinary negligence standards, for the safety of
others. This puts the urban landowner on constructive notice of dangerous tree
conditions, because constructive notice involves notions of reasonable inspection
naturally concurrent with the exercise of reasonable care."); Valinet v. Eskew, 574
N.E.2d 283, 285-86 (Ind. 1991) (adopting approach that urban landowners owe
duty to motorists to inspect trees because risk of harm to highway users is greater
than burden of inspection on landowners); Hensley v. Montgomery County, 334
A.2d 542, 545 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) ("To those who dwell in urban areas with
one or two trees in their yard at most, the onus of inspection is modest. The
farmer, the developer or the landed gentry who owns large and sometimes sprawl-
ing tracts of woodland adjacent to or through which a road has been built, may
19
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adjacent to a highway.10 3 Moreover, according to leading commen-
tators, courts ought to extend the Restatement exception to urban
natural conditions in general, rather than merely to urban trees.10 4
Although most tribunals have held rural landowners have no
duty to protect travelers from their trees,1 05 a few have extended
find the task of inspecting for trees dead, dying or decayed so potentially onerous
as to make property ownership an untenable burden."); Langen v. Rushton, 360
N.W.2d 270, 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (imposing duty on shopping center owner
to maintain parking area to protect safety of those travelling on public roads
nearby); Heckert v. Patrick, 473 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (Ohio 1984) (finding land-
owner not liable for motorist's injuries where landowner had neither actual nor
constructive notice of defective tree); Estate of Durham v. City of Amherst, 554
N.E.2d 945, 949 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) ("[A] landowner in an urban area has a duty
to exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to others from
decaying, defective, or unsound trees of which such landowner has actual or con-
structive notice."); Israel v. Carolina Bar-B-Que, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 123, 127 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1986) ("[A] landowner in a residential or urban area has a duty to others
outside of his land to exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of
harm arising from defective or unsound trees on his premises, including trees of
purely natural origin."), cert. denied, 360 S.E.2d 824 (1987).
103. See, e.g., Cornett v. Agee, 237 S.E.2d 522, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (find-
ing urban landowner liable for damage caused by tree striking neighbor's property
where landowner had notice of tree's defective condition); Mahurin, 390 N.E.2d at
524 ("The American Law Institute [in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 363 &
cmt. e (1965)] recognized the reasons for different treatment in urban and rural
areas, but did not extend the greater duty that possessors of urban property owe to
persons using the highways to adjoining landowners. We, however, believe there is
no reason to so restrict the landowner's duty ...."). See generally Noel, supra note
3, at 786-88 (discussing landowner liability for harm on adjacent land).
104. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 57, at 391. As this preeminent treatise
explains:
The tree cases may suggest that the ordinary rules as to negligence should
apply generally to natural conditions, at least in urban and residential
areas, so that the inquiry would focus upon such factors as the nature of
the locality, the seriousness of the danger, and the ease with which it may
be prevented, in the light of all the circumstances.
Id.; see also Chambers v. Whelen, 44 F.2d 340, 341 (4th Cir. 1930) (applying West
Virginia law) ("[I]f the duty be held to exist with regard to trees, it must exist also
with regard to other natural objects ....").
105. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 275 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1960) (con-
struing Oregon law to support view of non-liability of rural landowner for travelers'
injuries); Chambers, 44 F.2d at 341 (applying West Virginia law to find that highway
officials and not rural landowners are liable); Lemon v. Edwards, 344 S.W.2d 822,
823 (Ky. 1961) ("[T]here is a sound basis for not imposing upon the [rural] land-
owner a duty of inspection to determine whether, through natural processes of
decay, trees on the land have become dangerous to users of the road. The basis is
that such a duty would be an unreasonable burden in comparison with the risk
involved."); Zacharias v. Nesbitt, 185 N.W. 295, 296 (Minn. 1921) (declaring that
travelers assume risk of falling trees on rural highways); Hay v. Norwalk Lodge No.
730, 109 N.E.2d 481, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951) ("[Ilt is unreasonable to require
the owner of rural land to inspect his property with regard to naturally arising
defects because of the burden thereby imposed upon the owner of large and un-
settled tracts of land."); Albin v. National Bank of Commerce, 375 P.2d 487, 490-91
(Wash. 1962) (en banc) (finding that, absent knowledge of hazardous condition,
1282
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liability that far. Thus, in Medeiros v. Honomu Sugar Co., 10 6 an early
decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, a motorist recovered
damages from a corporate landowner when an aged eucalyptus tree
on its rural sugar plantation fell on his vehicle as he drove on an
adjacent public highway. The court imposed a duty on the defend-
ant despite the rural nature of the property in question.1 07 In Tay-
lor v. O/sen,'08 the Oregon Supreme Court considerably expanded a
landowner's duty when it similarly held a landowner could be liable
for a tree that fell on a vehicle on a rural road. It ruled that, as a
matter of fairness, a court cannot automatically deny victims recov-
ery on all but the rare occasions when the Restatement creates a
duty. 109
Other tribunals have expanded the duty of landowners in fall-
ing tree cases beyond the limits of the Restatement by requiring them
to act reasonably regardless of the nature of the land where the
trees are located.' 10 Finally, Ohio courts have ruled that the posses-
sors of property need not inspect their rural trees, but "an owner
having knowledge of a patently defective condition of a tree which
may result in injury to a traveler on a highway must exercise reason-
able care to prevent harm from the falling of such tree or its
rural landowner had no duty to inspect so long as forest was in its natural
condition).
106. 21 Haw. 155, 158-59 (1912). The court found that the landowner could
be held liable if he knew or should have known of the hazardous condition present
on his land, regardless of whether the condition was naturally caused. Id.
107. Id.; accord Whitesell v. Houlton, 632 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Haw. Ct. App.
1981) (finding tree owner liable for damage tree caused to neighbor's property);
Abbinett v. Fox, 703 P.2d 177, 181 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting Hawaii view
expressed in Whitesell because it balances landowner's ability to use property as
landowner desires with requirement that landowner exercise due care towards
others).
108. 578 P.2d 779 (Or. 1978).
109. Id. at 782-83. As the Taylor court indicated, "the great variety of interme-
diate patterns of land use, road use, traffic density, and preservation of natural
stands of trees in urban and suburban settings prevents a simple 'urban-rural' clas-
sification." Id. at 782. But see Siegel v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 717 P.2d 1245,
1250 (Or. Ct. App.) (analogizing to tree cases and finding that, absent knowledge
human activity was occurring near pole, defendant had no duty to inspect wire on
pole), review denied, 723 P.2d 325 (1986).
110. See, e.g., Dudley v. Meadowbrook, Inc., 166 A.2d 743, 744 (D.C. 1961)
(holding landowner liable for damage caused to neighbor's property by tree near
his apartment building and paved parking lot); Rowe v. McGee, 168 S.E.2d 77, 80
(N.C. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that where landowner knew tree was dangerous
there was duty to remove it); Falco v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 10 Pa. D. & C. 115, 115
(Pa.C.P. Montgomery County 1927) (finding landowner liable for fallen tree that
stood in front of his land but within limits of state highway); see also Albin v. Na-
tional Bank of Commerce, 375 P.2d 487, 491 (Wash. 1962) (en banc) (finding
landowner not liable if forest was in natural condition, but liable if logging opera-
tion on land caused danger about which landowner should have known).
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branches on a person lawfully using the highway.""'
In sum, numerous jurisdictions have moved beyond the tradi-
tional no duty rule, yet have not gone so far as to hold landowners
liable for all injuries natural conditions on their property cause to
those off their premises. Some follow the Restatement approach and
say possessors are responsible only when urban trees are the cul-
prits. Others say the duty extends to rural trees, or perhaps even
natural conditions in general. A final group of tribunals circum-
vent the traditional rule by employing the well-known doctrine of
statutory negligence to generate a duty for both urban and rural
landowners regardless of the type of natural vegetation that is
involved.
D. Use of Statutory Negligence Doctrine to Establish That Landowners
Have a Duty to Protect Those Off Their Premises From Harm
Caused by Natural Vegetation on Their Land
Many courts hold that certain statutes and other related enact-
ments, including municipal ordinances and administrative regula-
tions,112 can establish the negligence standard of care.' 13 When
someone violates such a law, courts may find that this person also
111. Hay v. Norwalk Lodge No. 730, 109 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Ohio Ct. App.
1951); accord Heckert v. Patrick, 473 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Ohio, 1984) (noting
lesser standard of care exists for rural landowner than urban landowner and that
knowledge of defect is prerequisite to duty of reasonable care); Nationwide Ins.
Co. v. Jordan, 639 N.E.2d 536, 537 (Ohio Hamilton County Mun. Ct. 1994) (not-
ing that in order "to recover upon a theory of negligence arising out of a tree's
falling, the evidence must establish that the defendant had actual or constructive
notice of a patent danger that the tree would fall"). As the Hay court elaborated:
If the danger [from the defective tree] is apparent, which a person can
see with his own eyes, and he fails to do so with the result that injury
results to a traveler on the way, the owner is responsible because in the
management of his property he has not acted as a reasonably prudent
landowner would act.
Hay, 109 N.E.2d at 486.
112. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 36, at 220 & nn.3-4 (noting that munic-
ipal ordinances and administrative regulations may establish standard of care re-
quired of reasonable person).
113. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 36, at 220-21 (noting that statutes
can establish negligence standard of care despite fact that most such legislation is
penal in character); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285(a)-(b), 286 (1965)
(stating that legislation can establish negligence standard of care). In outlining
when courts should find that a duty has been established by legislative pronounce-
ment, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose inter-
est is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
1284 [Vol. 39: p. 1263
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has breached a duty of care.1 14 The violation is labelled statutory
negligence, and may provide an injured plaintiff with evidence of
fault.115 In the alternative, the wrongdoer may be deemed conclu-
sively negligent-negligent per se-because of the violation.11 6
Thus, judicial construction effectively creates a special relationship
between individuals the legislature orders to behave in a certain way
and those benefitted by that designation. Various tribunals have
considered whether the statutory negligence doctrine creates a duty
between landowners and those off the premises when natural con-
ditions on the land, that exist in violation of a statute, injure those
off the premises.
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has re-
sulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which
the harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286. Numerous courts have employed this ba-
sic test when determining whether the provision in question creates a duty. For a
further discussion of negligence resulting from the violation of a statute, see infra
note 116 and accompanying text.
114. Once tribunals find such a duty, they determine the effect of this duty by
following the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. The Restatement specifies:
(1) The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administra-
tive regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of
conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.
(2) The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is not
so adopted may be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent
conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B. Thus, under either standard, the statu-
tory authority may impose a duty, and accordingly, a special relationship.
For further discussion of whether a particular statute creates such a responsi-
bility, as well as the effect of a finding that it does, see Crown v. Raymond, 764 P.2d
1146, 1148-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that violation of statute prohibiting
sale of firearms to minors constitutes negligence per se); Sanchez v. Galey, 733
P.2d 1234, 1242-43 (Idaho 1986) (concluding that violations of Occupational
Safety and Health regulations constitute negligence per se); Martin v. Herzog, 126
N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that failure to display lights, as required by
highway law, represents negligence, not mere evidence of negligence).
115. See, e.g., Nehringv. LaCounte, 712 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Mont. 1986) (noting
that statutory violation, though not negligence per se, is relevant for fixing negli-
gence standard).
116. See, e.g., Thelen ex rel Thelen v. St. Cloud Hosp., 379 N.W.2d 189, 192-94
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that violation of Vulnerable Adult Act imposes
absolute liability for damages); McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Miss. 1986)
(concluding that violation of statute that causes injury to members of protected
class constitutes negligence); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 36, at 229-30 (noting
that in cases of per se negligence from violation of statute, court takes over stan-
dard of conduct prescribed by legislature).
In this Article, the concept of statutory negligence refers to judicial applica-
tions of both the evidence of negligence and negligence per se approaches. When
a court concludes that a landowner is per se negligent, its holding is considerably
worse for the landowner than if the court merely ruled that the landowner's viola-
tion of the law would serve as evidence of negligence.
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A number of states, counties, municipalities and other govern-
mental units have provisions mandating that possessors of land
properly maintain vegetation (and other natural or artificial condi-
tions) on their premises so that it does not obscure the vision of
motorists on adjoining highways. Some courts have construed such
laws broadly, ruling that they can create statutory negligence liabil-
ity. Thus, individuals who violate these laws must compensate those
who are harmed as a result of the violation. For example, a Louisi-
ana tribunal employed a state statute to impose a duty on a land-
owner to keep an overgrown vacant lot free of vision-obscuring
weeds. 117
Several Arizona courts have acted similarly.118 In Hall v. Mertz,
a bushy oleander hedge blocked a driver's vision at an intersection,
contributing to a bicycle/automobile collision.1 19 A municipal or-
dinance prohibited landowners from maintaining anything on their
property that interfered with traffic visibility.1 20 The landowner in
Hall admitted that her hedge violated this ordinance.12' The Hall
court examined the ordinance and concluded that it met both of
the principal criteria necessary for establishing statutory negli-
gence.122 This conclusion was supported by two facts: (1) "the pur-
pose of the ordinance was to prevent accidents at intersections, and
specifically, the type of accident which occurred in this case,"' 23
and (2) the nine year old bicyclist/plaintiff belonged to the class of
individuals (those harmed in intersection collisions caused by hin-
dered visibility) that the Tucson City Council intended the ordi-
117. Savarese v. Bye, 398 So. 2d 1276, 1279 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
118. See, e.g., Johnson v. Maricopa County, 730 P.2d 862, 864-66 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that county ordinance created legal duty on landowners not
to erect fences in manner which obstructed motorists' view); Slavin v. City of Tuc-
son, 495 P.2d 141, 144 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that municipal ordinance
created duty on landowner not to erect fence obstructing visibility of traffic); Hall
v. Mertz, 480 P.2d 361, 363-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that landowner has
duty under city ordinance to maintain hedge at height and density that does not
interfere with traffic visibility); cf Boyle v. City of Phoenix, 563 P.2d 905, 906 (Ariz.
1977) (en banc) (holding that "in the absence of a statute, a highway authority is not
liable for personal injuries because it has allowed the view of an intersection to be
obscured by weeds or bushes which have grown up in a portion of the street or
along its boundary" (emphasis added)); Guy v. State, 438 A.2d 1250, 1255 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1981) (using criminal statute to establish standard of conduct in public
nuisance action).
119. Hat4 480 P.2d at 361-62.
120. Id. at 362.
121. Id. at 362 n.1.
122. Id. at 363. For a discussion of the criteria necessary for a finding of statu-
tory negligence, see supra note 113.
123. Hall 480 P.2d at 364.
[Vol. 39: p. 12631286
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nance to protect.124 Accordingly, the landowner had a duty under
the statutory negligence doctrine (here she was negligent per se)
even though she lacked a duty under the traditional no duty rule
that was incorporated in Arizona negligence law.125 Some Illinois
tribunals have reached this same result.'2 6
Other jurisdictions have examined the statutory negligence
doctrine in the overgrown vegetation cases more conservatively,
concluding that the doctrine's two criteria were not met. Thus, var-
ious Illinois plaintiffs, arguing for the application of statutory negli-
gence, have lost when courts decided that the laws to which they
pointed failed to satisfy the statutory negligence rule's two basic cri-
teria. 12 7 This same approach has been followed by some tribunals
in other states, such as Florida1 28 and Louisiana.129
The statutory negligence doctrine also was rejected in Wells v.
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.,' 30 where the Wisconsin
Supreme Court exhaustively studied a statute that required land-
owners whose property abuts a railroad/highway intersection to
trim trees and cut brush to avoid visual obstructions for travelers on
the thoroughfare. In Wells, a pickup truck and a train collided
when uncut or untrimmed brush or trees obscured the pickup
driver's view.' 3 ' The driver alleged that the owners of the property
124. Id.
125. For cases applying the traditional no duty rule under Arizona negligence
law, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. City of Aurora, 373 N.E.2d 1326, 1331 (Ill.
1978) (holding that municipality's own ordinance creating duty negates munici-
pality's immunity from suit); O'Neil v. Krupp, 589 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Il. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that ordinance requiring landowners to trim hedges and foliage so
as to maintain clear visibility in intersections establishes landowner's duty of care).
127. See, e.g., Pyne v. Witmer, 512 N.E.2d 993, 996-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that statute imposed no duty on landowners because statute was not in-
tended to protect against injury from foliage not planted in right-of-way of high-
way), aff'd on other grounds, 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989); Nichols ex rel. Nichols v. Sitko,
510 N.E.2d 971, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (concluding that violation of ordinance
was not negligence because ordinance was intended to benefit municipality at
large, not particular classes).
128. See, e.g., Stevens v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that landowner has no duty to maintain property so that ap-
proaching motorists can see other approaching motorists when motorists are not
within class ordinance protects); Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So. 2d 615, 615-16 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that municipal ordinance was not violated when integral
part of ordinance was police notification to landowner of obstruction and no such
notification was alleged).
129. See Wright v. Travelers Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 374, 376 (La. Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that landowner's violation of vegetation statute is not negligence per se
because statute did not relate to traffic safety).
130. 296 N.W.2d 559, 560-67 (Wis. 1980).
131. Id. at 559.
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had a duty to control the vegetation under the statutory negligence
.doctrine.132 After the court acknowledged its usual adherence to
that doctrine,1 33 it reviewed the law's 1889 legislative history134 and
concluded that "[t]he legislature imposed a duty on the abutting
landowner to help secure the public right of unobstructed passage
on the highway, not to protect any particular traveler from harm or
to grant each traveler the right to maintain a tort action for dam-
ages for a violation."13 5 Based on this narrow reading of the scope
of the legislative intent, the Wells court rejected the statutory negli-
gence argument. 136 Thus, the plaintiff's claim failed because the
defendant/possessor owed him no duty.13 7
In conclusion, the motorist harmed by overgrown vegetation
may, but not necessarily will, benefit from the statutory negligence
doctrine. Counsel must research the history of the statute in ques-
tion thoroughly and argue the statutory negligence doctrine com-
pellingly, because courts often are reluctant to derive a duty from a
statute.
II. PROPER APPROACH TO CASES WHERE NATURAL VEGETATION ON
LAND HARMS THOSE OFF THE PREMISES
Courts adopt a variety of approaches when determining
whether landowners have a duty to protect those off their premises
from natural conditions, including overgrown vegetation, on their
property. These approaches range from holding that landowners
have no duty,138 to saying that they always have such a duty,139 to
132. Id.
133. Id. at 560-61.
134. Id. at 563-65.
135. Id. at 565. The Wells court further elaborated:
We do not think the legislative purpose or intent was to allocate the eco-
nomic burden of railroad accidents to the landowner in addition to or in
lieu of imposing the burden on the railroad which operates the trains, on
the municipality which builds and maintains the highways, and on the
highway traveler who has an obligation to use due care, and more specifi-
cally, to look and listen.
Id. But see Walker v. Bignell, 301 N.W.2d 447, 454-56 (Wis. 1981) (concluding that
statute which required municipality to trim certain roadside vegetation generated
statutory negligence liability).
136. Wells, 296 N.W.2d at 565.
137. Id. at 565-66.
138. For a discussion of the traditional no duty approach, see supra notes 25-
74 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the approach of courts that always find a duty exists,
see supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
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taking a position somewhere in between. 140 Certain courts even
generate a duty from the statutory negligence doctrine. 14 1 Most
courts should be far more generous both to landowners' neighbors
and to travelers on public thoroughfares that are adjacent to land-
owners' property, and much less concerned about the rights of
landowners. A proper approach to this problem should balance
the competing interests more precisely.
The landowner's exemption from liability for natural condi-
tions was an offshoot of the doctrine that one only is liable for his
or her misfeasance, and not for mere nonfeasance. 142 This contrast
between nonfeasance and misfeasance remains viable in many juris-
dictions. Therefore, one who unreasonably fails to take precau-
tions to safeguard others from, for example, natural dangers on his
or her land is not liable for his or her carelessness because courts
say the landowner did not create the dangerous condition and thus
had no duty to act in the first place. On the other hand, if one
carelessly creates and/or maintains a dangerous artificial condition,
he or she may be liable in negligence for this misfeasance. As many
have observed, such disparate treatment between misfeasance and
nonfeasance is not really justified. 143 While the distinction has en-
140. For a discussion of the intermediate approaches that courts take, see
supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of the duty created by the statutory negligence doctrine,
see supra notes 112-37 and accompanying text.
142. For a general discussion of the nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction, see
supra note 26.
143. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 56, at 374-75. Many courts that purport to
excuse landowner nonfeasance do not actually do so in all cases. A landowner has
a duty to protect those off his or her property from artificial conditions on it even
though a prior possessor of the property created the condition and the present
owner did nothing about it. This inaction, or nonfeasance, does not shield the
landowner from liability. See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121, 1127-
28 (Cal. 1981) (en banc) (holding that right to control land is sufficient basis to
impose duty to act); Benham, supra note 75, at 256 (noting that landowner can be
liable for harm occurring due to artificial condition on premises even though
landowner played no part in creating condition). For further discussion of a land-
owner's duty to act when artificial conditions on land create a hazard, see supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
The explanation for this facially inconsistent result may be that in the case of a
natural condition, no past or present landowner ever assumed any responsibility
for a condition that was naturally on the land (perhaps for centuries). See
Burcham, supra note 26, at 640-41 (noting that new landowner must assume previ-
ously existing duty to be liable in negligence for failing to meet duty). In the case
of an artificial condition, however, some former owner of the land assumed a duty
by placing, allowing to be placed, or not acting to remove the artificial condition.
Id. at 640. This affirmative action, for which later possessors assume responsibility
when they take possession of the property, clearly is misfeasance rather than non-
feasance. Id. Nonfeasance in an artificial condition case seems nearly impossible
because, by definition, soneone had to create the artificial condition in question.
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dured in many jurisdictions in nonfeasance situations, 144 some
courts have begun serious attacks upon it.145 They do so obliquely
by creating exceptions to the nonfeasance "no liability" rule or
more directly by abolishing it outright.146
In Sprecher v. Adamson Cos.,14 7 the California Supreme Court
attacked the common law rule of no liability for injuries caused by
natural conditions/nonfeasance to those off-premises head-on and
declared it invalid.148 The Sprecher court focused on possession of
land as the key to duty.149 The court ruled that the possessor of
land has a duty to act reasonably regardless of whether a natural or
artificial condition on the land harms another or whether the pos-
sessor of the property is. guilty of misfeasance or mere nonfea-
sance. 150 In so doing, the Sprecher courit made a number of valid
points. All landowners should owe the same duty to all persons, on
or off the premises, harmed by conditions on the land, regardless
of whether those conditions are natural or artificial.15 1 This stan-
The landowner either created the condition, had someone else do so, or failed to
remove the condition despite having a duty to do so. Whichever occurred, this is
misfeasance. Id. at 640-41.
144. SeeJones, supra note 20, at 74-75 ("Despite the almost universal condem-
nation of this rule, courts continue to religiously enforce it.").
145. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 56, at 373-74 (noting courts' attack
upon misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction).
146. See id. (stating methods courts employ to avoid misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction); see also Pittsfield Cottonwear Mfg. Co. v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 53 A. 807
(N.H. 1902) (classifying failure to supply heat for building as mismanagement of
boiler so as to avoid nonfeasance stigma).
147. 636 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1981) (en banc). For further discussion of this case,
see supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of the Sprecher court's critical analysis of the no liability
rule, see supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
149. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1127 & n.8.
150. Id. at 1127-29. At one point, the Sprecher court suggested that a land-
owner's failure to make a dangerous natural condition safe for neighbors or pass-
ersby might not be nonfeasance at all. Id. Instead, the court implied that the
failure to act might be misfeasance because by possessing the land the owner pre-
cluded others, who might have taken appropriate precautions, from having it and
making the condition safe. Id. at 1127 n.8. As the Sprecher court explained:
It can be argued that by virtue of taking possession of a tract of land, and
thus preventing another from doing so, a possessor "hides the rope" that
others might toss to those outside the premises. That is, his possession of
land, having on it a dangerous condition, forestalls its possession by an-
other who might abate the condition. So viewed, any unreasonable fail-
ure to abate would constitute misfeasance. But it would be misfeasance
whether the dangerous condition was a natural or an artificial one.
Id. While ingenious, it is uncertain whether the original rationale for the natural/
artificial and nonfeasance/misfeasance classifications ought to be manipulated in
this fashion. For criticism of the reasoning employed by the Sprecher court, see
infra note 164.
151. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1128.
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dard promotes uniformity of treatment and result.152 California al-
ready had replaced the traditional trifurcated test for liability for
injuries incurred on the premises with one uniform standard of
duty which applies in all on-premises situations. 153 Thus, Sprecher
finally unified the standard of duty in all cases involving injuries to
individuals, either on or off of realty, regardless of whether the
means of injury are artificial or natural. 54 In post-Sprecher Califor-
nia, the possessor of land has a duty to act reasonably under the
circumstances; no longer can a landowner act carelessly but not be
liable in negligence because he or she owed the victim no duty of
care. 15 5
The reasons some courts articulate, for opposing a result like
that in Sprecher are not convincing. Disaster will not result from
holding landowners responsible for natural conditions on their
land, as experience in California has proven. Sprecher does not hold
anyone automatically liable in natural condition cases; rather, it im-
poses a duty and thereby requires a landowner to act reasonably.' 56
If it is reasonable to do nothing, that is precisely what a landowner
can do with impunity.'57 People have a duty to act reasonably dur-
ing most of their daily activities-the landowner does not need pre-
ferred status for special protection. Insurance is available to protect
unreasonable landowners from their negligence, just as it protects
landowners in cases involving artificial conditions on their land or
in any other situation where a duty clearly exists.' 58 In light of this,
it seems unlikely that the wholesale felling of healthy trees would
result from courts imposing a duty of reasonableness on landown-
ers. 159 Such has not been reported in jurisdictions that hold land-
owners responsible for their trees.
152. Id. at 1128-29.
153. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (holding
landowner subject to reasonable person standard irrespective of plaintiff's status as
trespasser, licensee or invitee); Benham, supra note 75, at 257-58 (noting that
other states have adopted Rowland, but its acceptance is far from universal).
154. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1128.
155. Id.
156. For further discussion of the duty imposed by the Sprecher court, see
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
157. This point was reflected in Justice Richardson's concurring opinion in
Sprecher, where he expressed considerable doubt as to whether any jury could find
the defendants negligent because of their failure to act. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1130
(Richardson, J., concurring).
158. For a discussion of the landowner's duty to protect persons off-premises
from danger caused by artificial conditions on the land, see supra note 3and ac-
companying text.
159. For the Iowa Supreme Court's contrary view, see text accompanying
notes 67-68.
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The rural/urban distinction drawn by some courts in natural
condition duty cases is unnecessary.1 60 Even if a duty exists in rural
settings, what is reasonable in an urban setting may not be reason-
able in a rural one. Thus, due to the nature of reasonableness, the
rural landowner may not be held to as strict a standard as the urban
landowner. 161 Such a result protects both the rural landowner
from an unduly onerous standard of care and the passerby from the
carelessness of a landowner whom the no duty rule would immu-
nize from all responsibility for lack of care. Moreover, no good rea-
son exists for treating urban or rural trees differently from other
natural conditions.1 62 A landowner should have to act just as rea-
sonably towards natural shrubbery, ponds, or landslides as towards
trees.1
63
As appealing as the California approach to nonfeasance/mis-
feasance landowner liability cases may be, implementing the uni-
form standard produces some transitional problems.1 64 In states
160. For a discussion of the rural/urban distinction drawn by some courts,
see supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
161. Ajury might consider various reasons why a rural landowner need not
do as much as an urban landowner. Special considerations in the rural setting
might include the difficulty in inspecting a large tract of rural land as opposed to a
small urban lot and the greater cost of maintaining a large rural estate as com-
pared with a suburban yard. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 57, at 391 (discuss-
ing rule that rural landowners have no duty to inspect trees for dangerous
conditions while urban landowners do have such duty). The Sprecher court listed
some of the factors that a jury should consider in deciding whether a given land-
owner acted reasonably when dealing with conditions on the land:
The likelihood of injury to plaintiff, the probable seriousness of such in-
jury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk, the location of the land,
and the possessor's degree of control over the risk-creating condition are
among the factors to be considered by the trier of fact in evaluating the
reasonableness of a defendant's conduct.
Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1128-29.
162. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 57, at 391 (advocating extension of
duty to all urban natural conditions, not just trees).
163. Of course, less may be expected of the owner of a condition like a pond
or landslide because the landowner may not be able to make it safe without ex-
pending unreasonable amounts that far exceed the cost of trimming or removing a
tree. For a discussion of the factors that ajury should consider in determining the
reasonableness of a landowner's action/failure to act, see supra note 161. Again,
the reasonableness test is the key. Sprecher, 636 P.2d at 1128.
164. The Sprecher court's attempt to transform a landowner's nonfeasance
into misfeasance by finding that the landowner's possession made it impossible for
some other, more careful or responsible, possessor of the land to fix a dangerous
natural condition is questionable. For a discussion of the Sprecher court's reason-
ing, see supra note 150. As Professor Burcham pointed out, such behavior simply is
not misfeasance. Burcham, supra note 26, at 637. The landowner did not create
the risk at issue, he or she merely failed to take action to remedy it. Id. Such
stretching of the law of misfeasance is unfair. Id. at 635-37. A court should either
uphold or deny nonfeasance liability per se. Courts should not try to avoid it
through strained characterizations of facts and the meaning of nonfeasance.
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retaining the trespasser/licensee/invitee categories in on-premises
injury cases, the Sprecher approach will promote, not eliminate, dis-
parity in result.165 A court applying the Sprecher rule will create a
duty in off-premises natural condition cases when none may exist in
an on-premises case because the victim is a trespasser or licensee to
whom the landowner owes no duty. This represents the reverse of
the problem that the California Supreme Court faced in Sprecher.
In such a situation, application of Sprecher results in the law gov-
erning landowners' duty to others being inconsistent depending on
whether the victim was on or off the land. The result in a premises
liability action should not vary merely because the victim was on
rather than off the defendant's acreage. Therefore, no state should
adopt the Sprecher approach until it also holds that landowners owe
a duty of reasonable care to anyone on their land.
While universal adoption of a duty to act reasonably in natural
condition off-premises liability cases will resolve the issue in most
situations, the statutory negligence doctrine still remains valua-
ble. 166 For example, in negligence per se jurisdictions, when a
court finds that a landowner has violated the relevant vegetation-
trimming provision, the landowner will be conclusively guilty of neg-
ligence and the plaintiff's course will be smooth. 67 Even where
violation of a statute is only evidence of negligence, the statutory
negligence doctrine will provide a streamlined method of proving a
landowner acted unreasonably, which may preclude the need for
more complex proof. 68 Hence, counsel always should consider the
availability and usefulness of the statutory negligence doctrine.
III. CONCLUSION
For centuries, landowners have enjoyed a preferred status in
the law of negligence because they often had no duty to act reason-
ably with regard to their land. Courts have distinguished among
those injured while on the premises according to their status as tres-
passer, licensee or invitee and off the premises by whether they
165. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 75, at 258 (contending that categorization
of entrants on premises is aberration from general duty to prevent harm to others
in one's activities).
166. Of course, statutory negligence could prove invaluable in a jurisdiction
that did not adopt the Sprecher-duty position. For further discussion of the statu-
tory negligence doctrine, see supra notes 112-37 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of negligence per se resulting from the violation of a
statute, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
168. This might obviate pursuing other avenues of proof. For a discussion of
some of the factors that courts consider in determining the reasonableness of a
landowner's action/failure to act, see supra note 161.
1293
31
Jones: Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
were injured by a natural or artificial condition of the land. Those
persons unlucky enough to be harmed off the premises by a natural
condition received nothing under the common law, because the
landowner owed them no duty to act reasonably. 169 Some jurisdic-
tions retain this archaic rule and thus refuse to compensate victims
whose injuries resulted from accidents caused by vision-obscuring
vegetation.
Other jurisdictions have recognized the fundamental unfair-
ness of the common. law and endeavored to get around it in various
ways, including distinguishing between rural and urban land or be-
tween trees and other natural conditions. 170 The preferable ap-
proach is taken by the jurisdictions that recognize that landowners
are like other tortfeasors, and thus have a duty to act reasonably,
regardless of the type of condition on their property that causes an
injury.171 These jurisdictions do so by realizing that liability is by no
means automatic, because an injured person must prove that the
landowner acted unreasonably in order to prevail. This determina-
tion of reasonableness depends on various factors, including the
location of the land in question.' 72 The modern approach fairly
places a duty of care on the landowner while requiring the injured
passerby to prove that the landowner was careless. The traditional
no duty rule has outlived its usefulness, and should be replaced by a
rule that treats all landowners the same regardless of the type of
condition on their property that harms those off the premises.
169. For a discussion of the traditional no duty rule, see supra notes 25-74 and
accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of the courts' use of the urban/rural distinction, as well
as distinguishing between trees and other natural conditions, see supra notes 98-
111 and accompanying text.
171. For a discussion of the modem rule that landowners have a duty to act
reasonably under all circumstances, see supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of some of the factors that courts consider in determin-
ing the reasonableness of a landowner's action/failure to act, see supra note 161.
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